One of the main reasons for wanting to compute a Nash equilibrium of a game is to predict how players will play. However, if the game has multiple equilibria that are far apart, or ǫ-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. In this paper, we define the notion of games that are approximation stable, meaning that all ǫ-approximate equilibria are contained inside a small ball of radius ∆ around a true equilibrium, and investigate a number of their properties. Many natural small games such as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors are indeed approximation stable. We show furthermore there exist 2-player n-by-n approximationstable games in which the Nash equilibrium and all approximate equilibria have support Ω(log n).
Introduction
One reason for wanting to compute a Nash equilibrium of a game is to predict how players will play. However, if the game has multiple equilibria that are far apart, or ǫ-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. In this paper, we define the notion of games that are (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stable, meaning that all ǫ-approximate equilibria are contained inside a small ball of radius ∆ around a true equilibrium, and investigate a number of their properties. If a game is approximation-stable for small ∆, then this means that even if players are only approximately best-responding, or even if the game matrix is not a perfect description of players' true payoffs, stationary play should in principle be predictable. Many natural small 2-player games such as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors are indeed approximation-stable for ∆ close to ǫ. In this paper we analyze fundamental properties of approximation-stable games.
We show first that all (ǫ, ∆) approximation-stable games must have an ǫ-equilibrium of support O(
log n), yielding an immediate n O( ∆ 2 log(1/∆) ǫ 2 log n) -time algorithm for finding an ǫ-equilibrium, improving by a factor O(∆ 2 log(1/∆)) in the exponent over the bound of [9] for games satisfying this condition (and reducing to the bound of [9] in the worst case when ∆ = 1). Note that by assumption, this approximate equilibrium is also ∆-close to a true Nash equilibrium. We in addition give improved bounds yielding polynomial-time algorithms for the case that ∆ and ǫ are sufficiently close together. Specifically, for ∆ ≤ 2ǫ − 6ǫ 2 we give an algorithm for finding O(ǫ)-equilibria in time n O(1/ǫ) . On the other hand, we show that for ∆ = O( √ ǫ), there exist n-action approximation-stable games in which the Nash equilibrium and all approximate equilibria have support Ω(log n), extending results of Feder et al. [8] . We also consider an inverse property, namely that all non-approximate equilibria are far from some true equilibrium, and give an efficient algorithm for finding approximate equilibria in games satisfying that condition.
Note that the classic notion of a stable Nash equilibrium is substantially more restrictive than the condition we consider here: it requires that (1) any infinitesimal deviation from the equilibrium by any player should make the deviating player strictly worse off (a strict equilibrium, implying that the equilibrium must be in pure strategies) and (2) such a deviation should not give the other player any incentive to deviate. Our condition can be viewed in a sense as a weaker, approximation version of requirement (1), namely that deviating by distance ∆ from the equilibrium should make at least one of the two players have at least ǫ incentive to deviate. Note that our condition does not require equilibria to be in pure strategies: as mentioned above, we give an example of a game satisfying our condition in which the Nash equilibrium and all ǫ-equilibria have support of size Ω(log n) (Section 5). The inverse condition that we consider in Section 6 can roughly be viewed as an approximation version of requirement (2) , namely that deviating by distance at most ∆ should cause (both) players to have at most ǫ incentive to deviate.
Related Work There has been substantial work exploring the computation of Nash equilibria in 2-player n × n general-sum games. Unfortunately, the complexity results in this area have been almost uniformly negative. A series of papers has shown that it is PPAD complete to compute Nash equilibria, even in 2 player games, even when payoffs are restricted to lie in {0, 1} [6, 1, 5] .
A structural result of Lipton et al. [9] shows that there always exist ǫ-approximate equilibria with support over at most O((log n)/ǫ 2 ) strategies: this gives an immediate n O(log n/ǫ 2 ) -time algorithm for computing ǫ-approximate equilibria and has also been shown to be essentially tight [8] . There has also been a series of results [7, 10, 4] on polynomial-time algorithms for computing approximate equilibria for larger values of ǫ. The best approximation guarantee known for polynomial-time algorithms is 0.3393 [10] .
There has also been work analyzing equilibria of special classes of games. For example, Barany et al. considered two player games with randomly chosen payoff matrices, and showed that with high probability, such games have Nash equilibria with small support [3] .
Definitions and Preliminaries
We consider 2-player n-action general-sum bimatrix games. Let R denote the payoff matrix to the row player and C denote the payoff matrix of the column player. We assume all payoffs are scaled to the range [0, 1]. We say that a pair of mixed strategies (p, q) is an ǫ-equilibrium if both players have no more than ǫ incentive to deviate. Formally, (p, q) is an ǫ-equilibrium if for all rows i, we have e T i Rq ≤ p T Rq + ǫ, and for all columns j, we have p T Ce j ≤ p T Cq + ǫ. We will typically use (p * , q * ) to denote a Nash equilibrium, which is an ǫ-equilibrium for ǫ = 0. Note that in a Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ), all rows i in the support of p * satisfy e T i Rq * = p * Rq * and similarly all columns j in the support of q * satisfy p * T Ce j = p * T Cq * .
We also are interested in the distance between mixed strategies. For probability distributions in this context, the most natural notion is variation distance, which we use here. Specifically we define:
We then define the distance between two strategy pairs as the maximum of the row-player's and column-player's distances, that is:
We now present our main definition, namely that of a game being approximation stable. Specifically:
So, fixing ǫ, a smaller ∆ means a stronger condition and a larger ∆ means a weaker condition. Every game is (ǫ, 1)-approximation stable, and as ∆ gets smaller, we might expect for the game to exhibit more useful structure. Many natural games such as matching pennies and rock-paperscissors satisfy (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability for ∆ = O(ǫ); see Section 2.2 for analysis of a few simple examples. We note that this definition is very similar to a condition used in Balcan et al. [2] in the context of clustering problems.
All our results also apply to a weaker notion of approximation stability that allows for multiple equilibria, so long as moving distance ∆ from any equilibrium produces a solution in which at least one player has ǫ incentive to deviate. Specifically, Definition 2 A game satisfies (ǫ, ∆)-weak approximation stability if, for any Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) and any (p, q) such that d((p, q), (p * , q * )) = ∆, at least one of the players has at least ǫ incentive to deviate ((p, q) is not an ǫ ′ -equilibrium for any ǫ ′ < ǫ).
Organization of this paper: We now present a few useful facts about the region around Nash equilibria and the relation between ǫ and ∆ in any game, as well as a few simple examples of games satisfying (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability for ∆ ≈ ǫ.
We then in Section 3 analyze properties of approximation-stable games, showing that every (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stable game must have an ǫ-equilibrium of support O(
) -time algorithm. Note that for large ∆ this exponent simply reduces to the O(
ǫ 2 ) bound of [9] , but improves as ∆ approaches ǫ. In Section 5 we give a near-matching lower bound, showing that there exist approximation-stable games with all approximate equilibria having support Ω(log n). In Section 4 we analyze games where ∆ is especially close to ǫ, and give polynomial-time algorithms for finding approximate equilibria when ∆ ≤ 2ǫ − O(ǫ 2 ). Finally, in Section 6 we consider the inverse condition that all strategies within distance ∆ of some Nash equilibrium are ǫ-equilibria, and give an efficient algorithm for computing (ǫ/∆)-approximate equilibria in this case.
Preliminaries
We begin with a few preliminary facts that apply to any 2-player general-sum game.
is a 3α-Nash equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
Claim 1 is useful because while it may be hard to determine how close some pair (p, q) is to a true equilibrium, it is easy to check how much incentive players have to deviate. Now, say that a Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) is non-trivial if at least one of p * or q * does not have full support over all the rows or columns. Notice trivial Nash equilibria, if they exist, can be computed in polynomial-time using Linear programming. We then have:
Claim 2 For any nontrivial Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) and for any α > 0, there exists (p, q) such that d((p, q), (p * , q * )) ≥ α and (p, q) is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that p * does not have full support. Let e i be a row not in the support of p * . Consider a pair of distributions (p, q * ) where p = (1 − α)p * + αe i . Since i was not in the support of p * , (p, q * ) has variation distance α from (p * , q * ). Yet, in (p, q * ), with probability (1 − α) both the players are playing best responses to each other. Hence, no player has more than α incentive to deviate.
Corollary 1 Assume that the game G satisfies (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability and has a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. Then we must have ∆ ≥ ǫ.
Some simple examples
A number of natural small games satisfy (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability for every ǫ > 0 and for ∆ = O(ǫ). Here, we work through two simple examples.
Game 1:
The row and the column matrices are 2 × 2 as follows:
Here, the only Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) is for the row player to play row 1 and the column player to play column 1, which are dominant strategies. Any deviation by distance ∆ from p * will give the row player ∆ incentive to deviate, regardless of the strategy of the column player. Similarly, any deviation of ∆ from q * will give the column player a ∆ incentive to deviate regardless of the strategy of the row player. Hence, for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1], this game is (ǫ, ∆)-stable for ∆ = ǫ.
Game 2:
This game is simply matching pennies:
Denoting the indicator vectors as e 1 and e 2 , the Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) is equal to ( 2 (e 1 + e 2 )). We now show that for any strategy which is ∆ far from (p * , q * ), at least one player must have ǫ incentive to deviate for ǫ = ∆ (1+2∆) (1+4∆) . Specifically, let (p, q) be ∆-far from (p * , q * ), and without loss of generality assume d(p, p * ) = ∆. We may further assume without loss of generality (by symmetry) that p = (
In this case the row player is getting a payoff p T Rq = ( 1 2 − 2∆∆ ′ ). Furthermore, he can move to row 2 and get a payoff of (
Hence, the incentive to deviate is at least ∆ ′ (1 + 2∆). Similarly, the column player has payoff p T Cq = ( 1 2 + 2∆∆ ′ ) and can deviate to column 2 and get payoff ( 1 2 + ∆), and hence has at least ∆(1 − 2∆ ′ ) incentive to deviate. The maximum of these two is minimized if we choose ∆ ′ so as to make the two incentives equal. This yields ∆ ′ = ∆ 1+4∆ , and the incentive ǫ to deviate is ∆ (1+2∆) (1+4∆) . Therefore, the incentive to deviate in any (p, q) that is ∆-far from (p * , q * ) is at least this large.
Solving for ∆ as a function of ǫ, this game is (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stable for ∆ = ǫ + O(ǫ 2 ).
The Support of Equilibria in Stable Games
We now show that approximation-stable games have structure that can be used to improve the efficiency of algorithms for computing approximate equilibria.
Theorem 1 For any game satisfying (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability, there exists an ǫ-equilibrium where each player's strategy has support O((∆/ǫ) 2 log(1/∆) log n).
Corollary 2 There is an algorithm to find ǫ-equilibria in games satisfying (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability, running in time n O((∆/ǫ) 2 log(1/∆) log n) .
Theorem 1 is proven in stages. First, we show that if the Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) has the property that p * is near-uniform over its support, then p * cannot have support of size greater than S = c(∆/ǫ) 2 log n for some absolute constant c. We then use this as a subroutine in our argument for the case of general distributions, showing existence of an ǫ-equilibrium of size at most O(S log 1/∆). Clearly, by symmetry, all claims hold for q * as well. The next two claims together address the case that p * is near-uniform over its support. We assume here that ∆ ≤ 1/4. Claim 3 If our game is (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stable, then p * cannot be written as a convex combination p * = xp 1 + (1 − x)p 2 of two distributions p 1 and p 2 over disjoint supports such that:
(ii) p 1 satisfies the following property: for every column j, the gap between playing j versus playing q * against p 1 is roughly the same as the gap against p * . Specifically,
Observe, if p * is uniform over a support of size ≥ S, then p * 2 2 = i (p * i ) 2 ≤ 1/S. Therefore, an immediate corollary of Claims 3 and 4 (using p = p * and q = q * ) is that if p * is uniform over its support, then |supp(p * )| < S < S log(1/∆) for S = c(∆/ǫ) 2 log n as desired by Theorem 1. We begin with the proof of Claim 3 then the proof of Claim 4, and then show how to address distributions p * with large L 2 norm to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof (Claim 3):
Suppose that p 1 , p 2 satisfying the conditions of Claim 3 exist; we argue the game cannot satisfy (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability. Let p ′ be the distribution
That is, we move ∆ probability mass from p 2 to p 1 (this is a legal probability distribution by property (i)). Since p 1 and p 2 have disjoint support, the variation distance d(p * , p ′ ) = ∆ and so (p ′ , q * ) is ∆-far from (p * , q * ). We now argue that in (p ′ , q * ), each player has less than ǫ incentive to deviate, violating (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability. The easy case is the row player who has no incentive to deviate since the column player plays q * , and the support of p ′ is contained in the support of p * . We now claim that for any column j, p ′T C(e j − q * ) < ǫ implying the column player has less than ǫ incentive to deviate as well. In particular, we have:
(by properties (i) and (ii))
We now prove Claim 4. Our proof makes extensive use of the Hoeffding Bound:
Theorem 2 (Hoeffding Bound) Let X i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, be n random variables, s.t. ∀i,
Then for every t > 0 we have that:
Proof (Claim 4): Let r be a random subset of the support of p; that is, for every element in supp(p), add it to r with probability 1/2. Also, let C i denote the ith entry of Cq. The idea of the proof is just to argue that for any column j, by the Hoeffding bound, with high probability over the choice of r, the distribution p 1 induced by p restricted to r satisfies the desired condition that p T 1 C(e j − q) is within ǫ 4∆ of p T C(e j − q). We then simply perform a union bound over j. Fix column e j . Let Y ij be the random variable defined as 2p i (C ij − C i ) if element i was added to r, and 0 otherwise. Observe that
. Let Z i be the random variable defined as 2p i with probability 1/2 (if element i was added to r), and 0 otherwise. Observe E[ i Z i ] = 1. Observe also that for every i we have that
The obvious reason for defining Y ij and Z i is that by denoting the distribution p restricted to r (renormalized to have L 1 norm equal to 1) as p r , we have:
by bounding the numerator from above and the denominator from below, we can hope to find r for which p r T C(e j − q) < E[ i Y ij ] + (ǫ/4∆), thus decomposing p into the desired p 1 = p r and p 2 = pr. We can do this using the Hoeffding bound and plugging the value of S:
where the last inequality is by definition of S. Thus,
. Similarly (and even simpler), we have that Pr
, and so the existence of r for which both events do not hold is proven. Observe that for this specific r we have that
using the fact that p T C(e j − q) ≤ 1. Thus, we have the desired decomposition of p.
Proof (Theorem 1):
We begin by partitioning p * into its heavy and light parts. Specifically, greedily remove the largest entries of p * and place them into a set H (the heavy elements) until either (a) the remaining entries L (the light elements) satisfy the condition that ∀i ∈ L, If (a) occurs first, we show that the game cannot satisfy (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability. Specifically, if we use p L to denote the induced distribution produced by restricting p * to L and renormalizing
S . Using Claim 4, we deduce we can write p L as a convex combination of p 1 and p 2 satisfying the properties of Claim 3. By denoting β as the total probability mass over H, and x as the total probability mass over p 1 , we have:
where p H is the induced distribution over H. Claim 3 gives that for
. We now consider the transition from p * to p ′ defined as
Thus, by transitioning from p * to p ′ the expected gain of switching from q * to any e j is
contradicting (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability.
If case (b) occurs first, then clearly H has at most S log(1/∆) elements. We now simply apply the sampling argument of Lipton et al [9] to L and union the result with H. Specifically, decompose p * as p * = βp H + (1 − β)p L . Applying the sampling argument of [9] to p L , we have that by sampling S elements from supp(p L ) = L, we are guaranteed that for any column e j , (U S ) T Ce j − p T L Ce j ≤ (ǫ/2∆), where U S is the uniform distribution over (the multiset) S. This means that forp = βp H + (1 − β)U S , all columns e j satisfy |p * T Ce j −p T Ce j | ≤ ǫ/2. We have thus found an ǫ-equilibrium with support of size S(1 + log(1/∆)) as desired. Proof: Let (p * , q * ) be a Nash equilibrium of the game. First, if there is no set S of rows having a combined total probability mass x ∈ [∆, ∆ + ǫ] in p * , then this implies that except for rows of total probability mass less than ∆, all rows in the support of p * have probability greater than ǫ. Therefore, p * is ∆-close to a distribution of support at most 1/ǫ. If this is true for q * as well, then this implies (p * , q * ) is ∆-close to a pair of strategies (p, q) each of support ≤ 1/ǫ, which by Claim 1 and the assumption ∆ < 2ǫ, is an O(ǫ)-equilibrium as desired. So, to prove the theorem, it suffices to show that if such a set S exists, then the game cannot satisfy (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability for ∆ ≤ 2ǫ − 6ǫ 2 .
Therefore, assume for contradiction that p * can be written as a convex combination
where p 1 , p 2 have disjoint supports and x ∈ [∆, ∆+ǫ]. Let γ = p T 1 Cq * −p T 2 Cq * and let V C = p * T Cq * . We now consider two methods for moving distance ∆ from p * : moving probability from p 1 to p 2 , and moving probability from p 2 to p 1 . Let
Since p ′ has distance ∆ from p * and its support is contained in the support of p * , by approximationstability, there must exist some column e j such that p ′T Ce j ≥ p ′T Cq * + ǫ. By (1) we have
. Therefore we have the constraint
Now, consider moving ∆ probability mass from p 2 to p 1 . Specifically, let
Again, there must exist some column e k such that
Therefore we have the constraint
From constraint (3) we have V C ( ∆ 1−x ) ≥ ǫ − ∆γ and from constraint (6) we have
Stable Games of Large Support
We now give a near-matching lower bound to the results of Section 3, showing that there exist stable games in which the Nash equilibrium and all approximate equilibria have support Ω(log n).
Theorem 4 For any ∆ ≤ 1/2, there exist n-by-n games satisfying (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability for ǫ = ∆ 2 /32 such that strategies for both players in the (unique) Nash equilibrium are uniform over supports of size lg(n).
Note that by definition of approximation-stability, Theorem 4 implies that all ǫ-Nash equilibria have supports of size at least (1 − ∆) lg(n). Thus, Theorem 4 implies the following near-matching lower bound to Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 For any ∆ ≤ 1/2 there exists an (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stable game G for some ǫ > 0 such that all ǫ-equilibria have support Ω(
ǫ 2 log n). The construction used to prove Theorem 4 builds on a construction in Feder et al. [8] exhibiting a game in which all approximate equilibria have support of size Ω(log n). However, the game in [8] does not satisfy stability and so a more involved construction and argument is needed.
Proof: We present the construction of the matrix R. The game will be constant sum with C = 1 − R. Let k = log 2 (n) and let α = ∆/4. The matrix R looks like:
Where
• X is k by k with all entries equal to 0.5.
• W is n − k by n − k with all entries equal to 0.5.
• Z is n − k by k where each row has (0.5 − α)k entries equal to 1 and (0.5 + α)k entries equal to 0. Specifically, all k (0.5−α)k different such rows appear. We can add multiple copies of these rows if needed to fill out the matrix.
• Y is k by n − k where each column has (0.5 − α)k entries equal to 0 and (0.5 + α)k entries equal to 1. Specifically, all k (0.5−α)k different such columns appear. We can add multiple copies of these columns if needed to fill out the matrix.
We begin with two observations about the above construction:
Observation 1: This game has a Nash equilibrium (p * , q * ) which is uniform over the first k rows and columns.
Observation 2: The value of this game is 1/2 to each player. So any (p, q) in which one player gets less than 1/2 − ǫ is not ǫ-Nash.
We now prove that this game satisfies (ǫ, ∆) approximation-stability for ǫ = ∆ 2 /32. Let (p, q) be some pair of distributions such that
] and let's assume without loss of generality that d(q, q * ) ≥ ∆. We want to show that this is not an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. It will be convenient to write q = q ′ + q ′′ where q ′ is nonzero only over the first k columns and q ′′ is nonzero only over the remaining n − k columns. 2 and yet p T Cq * ≥ 0.5 by Observation 2, so now the column player has at least αβ 2 incentive to deviate). Plugging in α = β = ∆/4, we get ǫ = αβ/2 = ∆ 2 /32 as desired.
For conceptual convenience, let us sort the entries of q ′ (i.e., the first k entries of q) in decreasing order. We now claim that
This will imply at least one player has at least ǫ incentive to deviate since one possible response of the row player is to play the row in matrix Z with 1's in the first (0.5 − α)k entries, gaining a value of at least 1/2 + αβ. Thus, if p T Rq ≤ 0.5 + αβ/2 then the row-player would have incentive at least αβ/2 to deviate to that row in Z, and if p T Rq ≥ 0.5 + αβ/2 then the column player would have at least αβ/2 incentive to deviate to q * ).
So, all that remains is to prove equation (7) . Let c = q (0.5−α)k .
Case 2a: c ≥ 1/k. In this case we simply use the fact that since the columns are sorted in decreasing order of q i , at least an (0.5 − α) fraction of the quantity d ′ (q, q * ) = k i=1 max(q i −q * i , 0) (think of this as the "excess" of q ′ over q * ) must be in the first (0.5− α)k columns. In addition, we have the remaining "non-excess"
So, summing these two and using d ′ (q, q * ) ≥ ∆ − β we get:
where the last inequality comes from our choice of α = β = ∆/4 and assumption that ∆ ≤ 1/2.
Case 2b: c ≤ 1/k. This implies that all the ∆ − β "excess" of q ′ over q * must be in the first (0.5 − α)k columns. In addition, these columns must contain at least a (0.5 − α) fraction of the "non-excess"
. This latter quantity in turn equals 1 − ∆, by using the fact
. Putting this together we have:
where the last inequality comes from our choice of α = β = ∆/4.
This completes Case 2 and the proof.
This example can be extended if desired to make the game be non-constant sum and also so that the sum R + C of the two matrices does not have a constant rank.
Inverse conditions
In this section we consider an inverse condition to approximation-stability, namely that for some true equilibrium (p * , q * ), all non-approximate equilibria are far from (p * , q * ). In particular, Definition 3 A game is (ǫ, ∆)-smooth if for some equilibrium (p * , q * ), all strategy pairs
We now show that games that are (ǫ, ∆)-smooth for ∆ large compared to ǫ have the property that good approximate equilibria can be computed efficiently. (Recall by Claim 1 that all games are (ǫ, ∆)-smooth for ∆ ≤ ǫ/3.)
Theorem 5 There is a polynomial-time algorithm to find an (ǫ/∆)-approximate equilibrium in any game that is (ǫ, ∆)-smooth.
We prove Theorem 5 through a series of claims as follows.
Claim 5 Let G be (ǫ, ∆)-smooth for equilibrium (p * , q * ). Then for every row i we have e T i Rq * ≥ p * T Rq * − ǫ/∆.
Proof: Let V R = p * T Rq * . Since (p * , q * ) is a Nash equilibrium, any row e i ∈ supp(p * ) will get an expected payoff of V R against q * as well. Now consider a row e i / ∈ supp(p * ). Let p = (1−∆)p * +∆e i and consider the pair (p, q * ). This pair is ∆-close to (p * , q * ) and hence, by the assumption that the game is (ǫ, ∆)-smooth, must be an ǫ-equilibrium. This means that p T Rq * ≥ V R − ǫ. So we get (1 − ∆)p * T Rq * + ∆e T i Rq * ≥ V R − ǫ, and using the fact that p * T Rq * = V R , this implies that e T i Rq * ≥ V R − ǫ ∆ .
Similarly, we have:
Claim 6 Let G be (ǫ, ∆)-smooth for equilibrium (p * , q * ). Then for every column j we have p * T Ce j ≥ p * T Cq * − ǫ/∆.
Using these claims, we can efficiently compute an ǫ ∆ -approximate equilibrium in smooth games. Proof (Theorem 5): Solve the following linear program for a pair of strategies p, q and values V R , V C :
From the previous claims we have that (p * , q * , V R = p * T Rq * , V C = p * T Cq * ) is a feasible solution to the above LP. Also, when playing (p, q), the row and the column players are getting expected payoff at least V R − ǫ ∆ and V C − ǫ ∆ respectively. Furthermore, by deviating from p, the row player can get a payoff of at most V R and by deviating from q, the column player cannot get more than V C . Hence, (p, q) is an ǫ ∆ -approximate Nash equilibrium.
Open questions and Conclusions
In this work we define a natural notion of the approximation-stability of 2-player general-sum games, and analyze a number of its properties. We show that one can improve over the general Lipton et al. [9] bound based on the extent to which the given game satisfies this condition. Furthermore, if ∆ < 2ǫ − O(ǫ 2 ) then we can find approximate equilibria in time n O(1/ǫ) . On the other hand, we show that approximation-stable games with small ∆ (but not so close to ǫ) can have their equilibria and all approximate equilibria of support Ω(log n). We also analyze an inverse condition for which we show finding (ǫ/∆)-approximate equilibria can be done efficiently. One open problem is to close the O( log 1/∆ ∆ 2 ) gap between upper and lower bounds for support size in the general case of (ǫ, ∆)-approximation stability; another is whether one can extend the n O(1/ǫ) -time algorithm from ∆ < 2ǫ − O(ǫ 2 ) to ∆ = O(ǫ). More broadly, perhaps this notion of stability can shed light on the larger open problem of obtaining an n poly(1/ǫ) algorithm for finding ǫ-equilibria in general games.
